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Statement of the Case 
The respondent, Angus H. Bishop, does not attempt 
to restate the facts under his heading, "Additional State-
ment of the Case"; while conceding that appellant's state-
ment contains an abstract of a substantial part of the evi-
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dence received at the trial, he contends that much favor-
able to respondent i~ omitted and that the recitation is 
more favorable to appellant than the record as a whole 
warrants. We challenge the latter contentions and submit 
that our abstract of the evidence fairly shows in substan-
tially the words of the witnesses the purport of the record 
on the controlling points in issue. 
We do not think it is an answer for responde~t to make 
the bare assertions indicated in his opening "Additional 
Statement of the Case," and as we shall hereinafter point 
out in reply to the remainder of respondent's brief, nowhere 
is there evidence cited which indicates anything but a com-
plete failure of proof on respondent's part to show any valid 
appropriation from the Duck Creek Dam whatsoever prior 
to 1903 or the acquisition of any right whatsoever by ad-
verse possession or otherwise subsequent thereto. 
Without repeating the Statement of Facts appearing 
on pages 2 to 57 of our original brief, we point out that the 
evidence of the various witnesses, including those called 
by respondent, show without conflict that appellant's po-
sition is correct. The detailed statement was made neces-
sary by respondent's generalizations throughout the course 
of this proceedings which are only plausible if the record 
itself is disregarded. 
We now specifically refer to the points argued by the 
respondent. 
Trial court supplied with a transcript of the evidence and 
view,ed the premises. 
This is true. The view of the premises was not evi-
dence, and occurred in June, 1946, more than four years 
prior to the findings. Such a cursory view could not add 
or detract from the evidence and we do not believe it would 
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mean as much to the trial court as pictures available in 
evidence at this time. Certainly it would be completely 
meaningless in determining what the use of water was pri-
or to 1903 and certainly it would be ineffectual in chang-
ing Stevens' testimony, on which respondent's case must 
entirely rest, that between 1906 when he began to farm 
as the predecessor in interest of respondent and 1944 when 
he sold out, he never questioned the right of Duck Creek to 
all of the low water; that he never claimed any water from 
the Upper Dam and only twice even in high water did he 
attempt to take the flash board out of the Lower Dam-
once in 1922 and once in 1927 -and on both occasions, they 
were immediately replaced and he took no further action. 
While the trial court did have available the transcript, 
the generalities of respondent's argument similar to those 
indulged in his brief were obviously accepted by the trial 
court without adequate check, an error which has made 
necessary this appeal and which does not justify a repe-
tition on this appeal wherein the facts, as well as the law, 
are to be reviewed. 
An example of the specious nature of respondent's ar-
gument in this regard is indicated in his closing statement 
under this heading, (p. 5), "If by a view of the premises it 
appeared that the ditches were on high ridges running 
through the property of plaintiffs, such fact would be con-
vincing proof that the same were for irrigation and not for 
drainage purposes - - - if old ditches were so located that 
they would serve no useful purpose except as a means of 
irrigating plaintiff's land, such fact would add considerable 
weight and might well justify the trial court in making a 
finding that otherwise would not be justified by the cold 
record of the evidence. (Emphasis ours) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
dence received at the trial, he contends that much favor-
able to respondent i;S omitted and that the recitation is 
more favorable to appellant than the record as a whole 
warrants. We challenge the latter contentions and submit 
that our abstract of the evidence fairly shows in substan-
tially the words of the witnesses the purport of the record 
on the controlling points in issue. 
We do not think it is an answer for responde~t to make 
the bare assertions indicated in his opening "Additional 
Statement of the Case," and as we shall hereinafter point 
out in reply to the remainder of respondent's brief, nowhere 
is there evidence cited which indicates anything but a com-
plete failure of proof on respondent's part to show any valid 
appropriation from the Duck Creek Dam whatsoever prior 
to 1903 or the acquisition of any right whatsoever by ad-
verse possession or otherwise subsequent thereto. 
Without repeating the Statement of Facts appearing 
on pages 2 to 57 of our original brief, we point out that the 
evidence of the various witnesses, including those called 
by respondent, show without conflict that appellant's po-
sition is correct. The detailed statement was made neces-
sary by respondent's generalizations throughout the course 
of this proceedings which are only plausible if the record 
itself is disregarded. 
We now specifically refer to the points argued by the 
respondent. 
Trial court supplied with a transcript of the evidence and 
view,ed the premises. 
This is true. The view of the premises was not evi-
dence, and occurred in June, 1946, more than four years 
prior to the findings. Such a cursory view could not add 
or detract from the evidence and we do not believe it would 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
mean as much to the trial court as pictures available in 
evidence at this time. Certainly it would be completely 
meaningless in determining what the use of water was pri-
or to 1903 and certainly it would be ineffectual in chang-
ing Stevens' testimony, on which respondent's case must 
entirely rest, that between 1906 when he began to farm 
as the predecessor in interest of respondent and 1944 when 
he sold out, he never questioned the right of Duck Creek to 
all of the low water; that he never claimed any water from 
the Upper Dam and only twice even in high water did he 
attempt to take the flash board out of the Lower Dam-
once in 1922 and once in 1927 -and on both occasions, they 
were immediately replaced and he took no further action. 
While the trial court did have available the transcript, 
the generalities of respondent's argument similar to those 
indulged in his brief were obviously accepted by the trial 
court without adequate check, an error which has made 
necessary this appeal and which does not justify a repe-
tition on this appeal wherein the facts, as well as the law, 
are to be reviewed. 
An example of the specious nature of respondent's ar-
gument in this regard is indicated in his closing statement 
under this heading, (p. 5), "H by a view of the premises it 
appeared that the ditches were on high ridges running 
through the property of plaintiffs, such fact would be con-
vincing proof that the same were for irrigation and not for 
drainage purposes - - - if old ditches were so located that 
they would serve no useful purpose except as a means of 
irrigating plaintiff's land, such fact would add considerable 
weight and might well justify the trial court in making a 
finding that otherwise would not be justified by the cold 
record of the evidence. (Emphasis ours) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
This statement tacitly concedes that the record does 
not justify the assumptions advanced. But it is not even 
claimed that a view would disclose any such things, as in-
deed it would not, and the assumptions are in direct con-
flict with the evidence which shows that the land in this 
lower area was comparatively level, and that the ditches 
were used merely as drainage to get the water off the up-
per land in high water (T. 197-698, 623-624, 685, 687). The 
only exception was a ditch that Andrew J. Stewart made 
to take water through a flume across Duck Creek from 
the Big Spring area to land now owned by La Von Payne. 
This flume water was supplemented at times with Duck 
Creek water, and this apparently is the basis of respond-
ent's claim to the use of water on his land prior to 1903. 
Yet, the record is undisputed that this was land not of plain-
tiff's predecessors, which was referred to as land marked 
on Exhibit A in red but was land to the east marked in 
white, which now belongs to LaVon Payne whose limited 
award respondent now questions (T. 481, 488, 490). 
The evidence does not show that plaintiff's premises were 
irrigated from the Duck Creek Dam or coursed through 
ditc~ therefrom leading to his land before 1903 or at all; 
on the contrary, the undisputed evidence expressly refutes 
this contention, except as Stevens after 1906 used high or 
surplus water. 
Under the heading in respondent's brief of which the 
foregoing statement is the antithesis, respondent has cited 
no evidence in the record which supports his position, and 
none can be cited. 
The opening argument of law, with respect to a prior 
intent to appropriate has no bearing in this case, for any 
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high water use made by Stevens after he came onto the 
land in 1906 had no relation whatsoever to any previous 
use, and he admitted that he knew nothing about any use, 
or attempted use, prior to 1906. Had there been any in-
tent to use water on the land in question in the 1880's as 
respondent now seems to contend, it would be unsupport-
able doctrine that almost a generation later a flood water 
use by Stevens could relate back to such intent. But the 
fact is that no intent in regard to plaintiff's land, as dis-
tinguished from land of the defendant, LaVon Payne, was 
ever even suggested in the record. 
Now turning specifically to the contention of respond-
ent that there was a use of water on his land prior to 1903, 
respondent's only reference to Ray Stevens' testimony on 
this point is on pages 14, 15 and 22 of the transcript. On 
page 14, Stevens testified that ditches he described were 
on the land ever since he could remember, which would be 
from the time he was ten years old. On page 15, he tes-
tified water was coursed through them ever since he could 
remember. He was sixty years old at the time of the trial. 
But when he was asked through which ditches water was 
coursed he answered, "I have taken wateP out here and 
down the ditch to my land . " Obviously he was 
talking about after 1906 when he first began to farm in 
that vicinity. This is made certain on page 22, when he 
was asked: 
"Q. When was that to your knowledge first ir-
rigated by water that comes from the Duck Creek 
Dam? 
"A. Well, I can't say that anybody irrigated that 
before that but I have watered down there every year 
since the year 1906. 
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"Q. And do you know whether there was water 
used there before that? 
"A. Well, I presume Stewart did but I couldn't 
say whether or not he did. 
"Q. I think you said you were down in that area 
for how many years before 1906? 
"A. Well, I have been skating down through 
there when I was ten years· old. Of course that was in 
the wintertime then." 
How can an appropriation be based upon such testi-
mony? What quantity? What acreage? What duty? 
What period? 
Stevens' testimony cited by respondent, as his other 
testimony, just does not support any use prior to 1906, 
much less any appropriation. As against this, we have 
cited numerous portions of Stevens' testimony showing that 
the only use that he made of Duck Creek water from the 
Duck Creek Dam was excess or high water after 1906, and 
he admitted that prior to his buying the land in 1906 his 
visits were casual and he didn't have any water right in 
mind (T. 121) and that he knew that the other users on 
Duck Creek over the years from the time he went there 
in 1906 had been using the water practically at all times, 
that there was a dam there in 1906 and that by the repu-
tation the users had all the water at the Upper Duck Creek 
and the Lower Duck Creek users were having trouble about 
that (T. 157-158). 
The William Betts testimony cited by respondent on 
pages 179 to 181 of the transcript fails to show any use of 
water on what can be identified as plaintiff's land at any 
time. The oats and barley he remembered being irrigated 
on the Andrew J. Stewart property were just west of the 
Jackson Stewart home (T. 180) which is considerably east 
of plaintiff's land and although he said the ditch extended 
west about eighty rods he did not testify that anything 
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was irrigated beyond the vicinity of the Jackson Stewart 
home, which is far from the east boundary of plaintiff's 
property. 
The only other evidence cited by respondent on this 
point is that of one referred to by respondent as "A. J. 
Stewart," who was really J. W. Stewart, Andrew Stewart 
being deceased at the time of the trial. A relatively few 
pages of J. W. Stewart's testimony are cited by respond-
ent in a very cursory treatment. For the substance of his 
entire testimony, reference is made to pages 26 to 33 of 
our original brief. 
None of respondent's references define the land on 
which Duck Creek water was used as any part of the land 
now belonging to plaintiff. On the contrary, the witness 
expressly stated that he saw no water used as far west as 
plaintiff's land (T. 480-481) and said that the land watered 
was south of the racetrack pasture and east of it, a little 
farther east from the land painted in green, red and black 
on plaintiff's Exhibit A (T. 473) and that the white tract 
immediately east of the red and green was where the wa-
ter was put (T. 181). He further testified that this was the 
land now belonging to La Von Payne-the Eliza Stewart 
land-(T. 181) and he further testified that when water 
was used even east of the red on the map it was early in 
the Spring when there was lots of water all over the coun-
try and that when they were irrigating from the dam there 
was none coming down there (T. 490). 
These are some of the references which respondent 
cites, but they are in direct conflict with his claims. 
In short, the only evidence of an old use on which 
plaintiff relies refers not to plaintiff's land but to land east 
of such land, being that now owned by LaVon Payne, and 
the record can be searched in vain for any testimony of the 
irrigation of other land in that vicinity. It is true that 
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even that irrigation was during excess or high water (T. 
490) but how then can plaintiff support his claim to an ap-
propriation of a low-water right on his land when the evi-
dence on which he relies shows that the use was on other 
land, and was a high or excess water use when the irriga-
tion season had not commenced for the predecessors in 
interest of the Duck Creek Irrigation Company at the Duck 
Creek Dams? 
Based on this and other evidence, the trial court 
awarded LaVon Payne a high water right which respond-
ent in his brief questions. We will hereafter refer to this 
again, but here suffice it to say that if, as plaintiff claims, 
the evidence showing this early high water use on the 
La Von Payne land not included in the Duck Creek incor-
poration does not authorize the award of a high-water right 
to Payne, how could it authorize the award of a low-water 
right to plaintiff whose land was not even involved? 
The water from the Springs north of Payson is sufficient 
to water all of plaintiff's pasture land and there was no 
occasion to award plaintiff any water from Duck Crook 
even as a hi'h water ri,ht. 
Respondent argues "that the evidence shows that the 
water from the Springs north of Payson is not available 
for the irrigation of the easterly part of plaintiff's land and 
therefore if respondent is deprived from securing water 
diverted at the Duvk Creek Dam, the easterly part of plain-
tiff's property will be rendered valueless." 
The only use of Duck Creek water shown on the east-
erly part of plaintiff's property was high or excess . water 
before the beginning of the irrigation season and almost 
entirely since 1906. His land will be equally as valuable 
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by a recognition of the rights of the Duck Creek Irrigation 
Company herein as it ever was, but what he is seeking to 
do is to take appellant's water to make it more valuable. 
The thirty acres of grain which Stevens admitted was the 
only cultivated land he watered since he began farming in 
1903 was, and is, served by a Strawberry water right in-
dependent of Duck Creek. 
As to his westerly land served from the Stevens Dam, 
and under which it is claimed, and the court found, one 
hundred acres of pasture land was irrigated, there was no 
justification of awarding anything from Duck Creek Dam 
and certainly not a low-water right as the lower court in 
effect has done. The flow of water from the Big Springs 
area, entering Duck Creek below the Duck Creek Dam, 
according to Stevens, as we pointed out in our principal 
brief, averages about two second feet, and this is adequate 
to provide for this pasture land. It requires no water over 
the Duck Creek Dam, and such water was never used by 
Stevens except during high periods when the water could 
not be used up above. The evidence shows that after the 
first of May, the Duck Creek Irrigation Company has re-
quired all the normal flow, and even then there has been in-
sufficient water to provide for the cultivated lands of its 
stockholders. 
Respondent mentions Jacob's measurements on June 
15th, 1946, showing that only 1.13 second feet was coming 
in below the Duck Creek Dam for Stevens and he argues 
that this was insufficient for one hundred acres of pasture 
land; without mentioning the measurements up above, he 
infers that the Duck Creek Irrigation Company at the same 
time had more than a reasonable share.. The amount of 
water then being diverted at the Upper Dam was .84 of a 
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second foot (T. 439) and the water at the Duck Creek Dam 
was 2.01, or a total of 2.85 at both dams for all the land 
of all of the Duck Creek stockholders, comprising well in 
excess of four hundred acres. This was, ,according to the 
evidence, unusually low water for the time of the year, but 
it meant that even as the water has always been used be-
fore at this stage of the flow, with the company having a 
complete priority during the irrigation season, at, and 
above, the Duck Creek Dam, Stevens for one hundred acres 
of pasture land was getting 1.13 second feet while for more 
than four times the area of cultivated land, the Duck Creek 
Irrigation Company was getting only 2.85 second feet. But 
under the lower court's decree at this stage of the flow, 
the company would only get a priority of two second feet 
for its approximately four hundred fifty acres of cultivated 
land, while plaintiff not only would get the 1.13 second feet 
of Big Springs water for his one hundred acres of pasture 
land, but would also pro-rate on the .85 second feet of wa-
ter above the Duck Creek Dam. With the the low-water 
flow increased, the situation would be alike indefensible 
and would convert the prior rights of Duck Creek, unques-
tioned at all times until recent years, into a qualified, limi-
ted right at the expense of the stockholders and to the di-
rect gain of plaintiff. 
We shall only refer to our principal brief in connection 
with respondent's argument that Stevens irrigated more 
than one hundred acres of pasture land, and sixty-eight 
acres of cultivated land. We believe it clearly appears that 
instead of sixty-eight acres, Stevens in no one season irri-
gated more than thirty acres of grain, and this had a Straw-
berry water right also, and all of this was after 1906. The 
acres referred to by respondent from Stevens' testimony 
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were during very recent years and were cumulative rather 
than in any one year, and if any Duck Creek water was 
used thereon, it was out of surplus or high water, during 
the early part of the season. No appropriation could be 
founded on such testimony. 
No right to ditches leading from the Duck Creek Dam was 
established by plaintiff. 
On this branch of respondent's argument, we will avoid 
repetition and refer to our Statement of Facts and to our 
discussion on pages 77 to 81 of our principal brief. There 
is one new matter that is injected-the decree in the case 
of A. H. Raleigh v. A. J. Stewart, Jr., et al. This has ab-
solutely no bearing on any ditches involved in this case. 
The water right involved was from the Springs on the 
south of Duck Creek which enter Duck Creek below 
the Duck Creek Dam and above the Stevens Dam. The 
Findings in this case describe the property involved as ly-
ing south and principally west from the quarter section 
corner between sections 30 and 31, which is the land under 
the Stevens Dam and entirely different than any area plain-
tiff claims he has a right to water from the Duck Creek 
Dam. The Findings and Decree refer specifically to 
Springs, which we have called the Big Springs area, and 
which we have shown plaintiff gets below the Duck Creek 
Dam. Our point has been that this water is available for 
plaintiff's use on the one hundred acres of pasture land 
watered from the Stevens Dam, which is conceded and we 
do not question plaintiff's rights to the ditches from the 
Stevens Dam. What we say is that no ditch rights from 
the Duck Creek Dam have been shown by plaintiff through 
grant, prescription or otherwise. The "slough or slough 
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springs" mentioned in the Raleigh Decree are the Payson 
Slough or Big Springs and have no reference to Duck 
Creek. 
Duck Crook Irrigation Company has not only an unquali-
fied right to the use of water through the Upper Dam, but 
through the Duck Creek Dam, being a total priority of at 
least eight second feet during the irrigation season, to-
gether with a reasonable diversion of higher water during 
the early season. 
Under the corresponding heading of respondent's ar-
gument arriving at a different conclusion, he considers that 
the company has unquestioned priority at the Upper Dam 
but contends that the two second feet awarded by the trial 
court satisfies such priority. He disregards the established 
fact that the priority of the company is, and always has 
been, at both dams as against any lower users. As be-
tween the stockholders of the company, it was recognized 
that the Upper Dam had first claim, but both rights go 
back before 1870 and have been recognized and adminis-
tered ever since as against all lower users, and the division 
between the two dams has been solely under the control 
of the company and its predecessors. Sometimes, all of 
the water would be taken at the Upper Dam, sometimes at 
the Duck Creek Dam and no one except the company and 
its predecessors had any voice in this 
There are about one hundred fifty acres of cultivated 
land under the Upper Dam and more than three hundred 
acres of cultivated land under the Duck Creek Dam. Even 
taking respondent's argument at its face value, two second 
feet in priority would be entirely insufficient for the con-
ceded priority at the Upper Dam, since the flow available 
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there decreases during the irrigation season to a much 
smaller amount, and Jacob's testimony on duty of water 
envisaged a constant flow. For example, Jacob's June 
measurement showed .83 of a second foot at the Upper 
Dam, insufficient for even half of the land there. With 
the irregular flow, it is a fair inference that the duty would 
be nearer fifty acres per second foot, which would give 
the Upper Dam three second feet and the Lower Dam at 
least six. An unqualified priority at both dams of eight 
second feet is inadequate but with a reasonable division of 
water in excess of that amount also the stockholders can 
survive. With less than that, they will be irreparably in-
jured. The Duck Creek Dam users have just as great a 
claim to priority as against plaintiff as the Upper Dam. 
There has never before been any limitation as to the 
amount of water the Upper Dam uses to the extent of their 
needs, except by agreement with the lower stockholders. 
How can respondent deny the priority of one dam when 
he must, of necessity, concede the priority of the other, 
the water always having been divided by the company and 
its predecessors between the two as the respective neces-
sities indicated, independent of any claims of plaintiff and 
his predecessors? With such unqualified priority at both 
dams, the supply even then has proved inadequate. It is 
completely unjustified to limit that priority to less than 
eight second feet. 
Pasture land and drains. 
Respondent infers that the irrigation of pasture land 
is as important as that for cultivated crops. Pasture land 
is usually taken care of by high or excess water, as the 
record shows is the case here. It would be unthinkable 
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that farmers who have f-ounded a community on the basis 
of cultivated crops should be crowded out by the unauthor-
ized extension of a high water use for pasturage. With 
further reference to pasturage, we call attention to the 
fact that Stevens' lower land had a problem of too much 
water rather than too little by reason of sub-surface drain-
age. Respondent attempts to make a point that the upper 
drains have changed this situation. We do not think the 
record supports this contention and rather shows that there 
are big drains through Stevens' own land, which is included 
in the drainage district. These are the drains which af-
fect his own land and yet, he is apparently content to have 
them remain. 
The plaintiff has availabl~ not only the excess and 
run-off water from the company ditches but the drains on 
his land. The company has filed on the upper drains and 
they are an integral part of its rights, as the water drain-
ing into Duck Creek naturally was prior to the construc-
tion of the drains. They have used the water as a part of 
Duck Creek under claim of right for many years. Whether 
its rights are deemed by virtue of its underground water 
claims or by reason of its right to the flow of Duck Creek 
as such, it seems clear that its claims are paramount to any 
pleaded or other claims of plaintiff. The drainage district 
makes no claim and its default was entered. 
Respondent's cross-appeal 
The respondent devotes the last five pages of his brief 
to points of his purported cross-appeal. What has been 
said in our principal and this brief we believe meets most 
of these points. 
We should add that this is not a case where the issue 
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of damages was reserved. It may be true that a party 
may have a right to demand a trial by jury on legal issues 
or to ask for equitable issues to be resolved first, but we 
have no such case here. The entire case was submitted to 
the court and both sides without qualification rested in 
the first instance (T. 823) .. The court thereafter ordered 
that additional parties be brought in, and the pleadings 
were completed as to these, and a further hearing held. 
Thereupon, all parties rested ( T. 936) and the case was 
argued to the court, taken under advisement and a decision 
made by the court. There is nothing involved here but a 
failure of proof as to damages. There was no motion to 
reopen, no request for a reservation of issues or any other 
matter on which error coud be predicated. It might just 
as well be contended that in any equity case, error can be 
predicated by a party on his own failure or inability to offer 
evidence of damage. 
We think the court erred not in limiting the amount 
of cultivated land plaintiff was permitted to irrigate to 68 
acres, but in finding that the plaintiff had the right to ir-
rigate any cultivated land from the Duck Creek Dam as 
against the defendant company. We think this point has 
been sufficiently argued. 
It may be noted that as against Payne and Lindstrom, 
propably no cross-appeal lies, since they did not participate 
in the initial appeal. It might properly require an initial 
appeal by plaintiff to raise any error in the award to them. 
However, we do not think the court erred in awarding 
Lindstrom and Payne the high water rights it did. Lind-
strom may not have shown any use prior to 1903, but nei-
ther did the plaintiff from the Duck Creek Dam. If any-
thing, the court erred in making Lindstrom's high-water 
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right subject to plaintiff's. The basic error of the court 
was in awarding to plaintiff any rights whatsoever out of 
the Duck Creek Dam and particularly any low-water right. 
It is in no position to complain because Lindstrom or Payne 
was awarded a right subject to his. If Lindstrom has no 
high-water right out of the Duck Creek Dam, then cer-
tainly the plaintiff is not entitled to even a high-water 
right. 
As to Payne, the evidence shows that he is successor 
in interest to Eliza Stewart, and as heretofore pointed out, 
his was the land upon which J. W. Stewart testified that 
the use of water was made for which plaintiff now claims 
an appropriation prior to 1903. His right is far superior 
to any right that plaintiff may lay claim to and we think 
that Payne should have been awarded a right superior to 
any high-water right of plaintiff at the Duck Creek Dam. 
We think that plaintiff's claim at the Duck Creek Dam 
should be denied by this Court, which should have the ef-
fect of making Payne's claim secondary only to the com-
pany's right at that point, in which position Payne has 
authorized us to indicate his joinder. We respect the fore-
bearance of Lindstrom and Payne as an officer and former 
officer of the company in electing to assert no right as 
against the company notwithstanding that Payne, as suc-
cessor in interest to Eliza Stewart, might maintain with 
much force that he has a primary right at the Duck Creek 
Dam, and Lindstrom has shown a right at least equal to 
the plaintiff. But this would not justify the denial to them 
of at least the high-water right recognized by the trial 
court, subject to the company's right. 
The very argument that Lindstrom has established no 
high-water right since his additional use was initiated after 
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1903, is in essence a confession that plaintiff has no right 
at the Duck Creek dam, based as it is entirely on Stevens' 
use after 1906. We submit on behalf of these parties and 
with their authorization that if a high-water right be rec-
ognized by this Court at the Duck Creek Dam in favor of 
plaintiff, the right of Lindstrom with equal priority should 
be recognized and the superior right of Payne recognized, 
subject to the rights of Duck Creek Irrigation Company, 
against which they make no claim. 
This being a suit in equity, the awarding of costs was 
discretionary with the court, whether the Ruies of Civil 
Procedure be considered or the statute previously in force 
(Rule 54[d] [1] U.R.C.P.), 104-44-4, U.C.A., 1943. 
The plaintiff claimed in his complaint a right to a large 
quantity of water, with priority over the defendant com-
pany. He could hardly be considered the prevailing party 
even though this were not a suit in equity. It could with 
as much force be contended that the court shouid have 
awarded costs to the company. The court did not abuse 
its discretion. 
Conclusion 
Without reiteration, we invite attention to our main 
brief, which seems to cover other arguments advanced by 
respondent. The plaintiff's grounds of cross-appeal should 
be denied. Th~ judgment of the lower court should be 
modified to award to the defendant company at least eight 
cubic feet of water per second from the Upper and Duck 
Creek Dams as an unqualified right paramount to any 
claims of plaintiff, with an additional high-water right in 
conformity with the irrigater acreage under iti in relation 
to the acreage shown by the evidence to be under the Ste-
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vens' Dam, after the Stevens' Dam is charged with the wa-
ter entering Duck. Creek from the Big Springs area below 
the Duck Creek Dam, as· is more fully discussed hereinbe-
fore and in our former brief. . 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. SHERMAN CHRISTENSON 
for CHRISTENSON & CHRISTENSON, 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
Duck Creek Irrigation Co. 
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